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AKAMAI TECHS., INC. V. LIMELIGHT NETWORKS,
INC.
692 F.3d 1301 (FED. CIR. 2012)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Akamai Techs., v. Limelight Networks, Inc., the Federal
Circuit reviewed the direct infringement requirement in the context
of a method claim.' The specific question was whether the direct
infringement requires a single actor to perform all the recited
2
steps. In short, the court decided it was not required.
Remarkably, despite precedent to the contrary, the court took a
flexible view of inducement under § 271(b), essentially abolishing
the single actor requirement in the context of method claims, and
taking a substance-over-form approach to the issue.' Also, rather
than wearing patent law blinders, the court admirably looked to
agency principles in tort and criminal law contexts, exercising a
broad view of the law in reaching its decision.'
In Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., the Federal
Circuit consolidated two district court cases to consider the long
standing rule that induced infringement of method claims required
a single actor to perform all the elements to satisfy infringement.'
1. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), cert dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 1520 (2013), cert dismissed, 133 S. Ct.
1521 (2013).
2. Id. at 1305.
3. Id. at 1305-06.
4. Id. at 1306.
5. Some commentators, including Judge Rifkind and Judge Posner, worried
that establishing specialized courts such as the Federal Circuit would be
detrimental to the law. The commentators argued that having these specialized
courts would deprive judges from being able to view legal issues in a broad
context. This would deprive certain areas of law, such as patent law, from
exposure to other areas of law that could provide valuable insight and
improvements. Specialized courts could be at risk of going off on their own
paths divergent from other general areas of law. Richard H. Seamon, The
Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 543, 557-58 (2003).
6. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1305.
235
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In the first case, Akamai Technologies, Inc. ("Akamai") owned a
patent with method claims covering efficient delivery of web
content.7 Akamai claimed that Limelight Networks, Inc.
("Limelight") infringed its patent by completing several steps of
the patent's claimed method, but left the final step to be completed
by Limelight's customers.! In the second case, McKesson
Information Solutions, LLC ("McKesson") owned a patent with
method claims covering communications between healthcare
providers and their patients.9 McKesson alleged that Epic Systems
Corp. ("Epic") induced infringement of its patent by providing
software to its customers that allowed the healthcare providers and
patients to infringe McKesson's patent by performing every
element of the patent."o In both cases, the patent holders claimed
the alleged infringers induced infringement of their method
patents. "
The trial courts in both cases relied on previous Federal Circuit
decisions to hold no liability for induced infringement because no
single actor performed all of the steps required for direct
infringement.12 On appeal, the two cases presented unique
questions to the court. First, in the Akamai case, the issue was
whether a defendant could be held liable for inducing infringement
where the defendant performed some steps of a claimed method
but induced other parties to complete the remaining steps. 3
Second, in the McKesson case, the issue was whether a defendant
could be held liable for induced infringement where the direct
infringement of the method claim was performed by multiple
actors, but no single party performed the entire method itself.14
II. BACKGROUND
Akamai owned a patent covering a method for the efficient
7. Id. at 1306.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id
11. Id.
12. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1306-07.
13. Id. at 1305.
14. Id.
236
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 8
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol24/iss1/8
AKAMA4I TECHNOLOGIES
delivery of web content." The method involved placing some of a
content provider's content on a set of remote servers and then
instructing the content provider's webpage to reach out to those
servers when the page required that information, thereby
modifying the content provider's webpage." Limelight, the
accused infringer, utilized a similar system for delivery of web
content; however Limelight's system did not modify the content
provider's webpage. 7  Instead, Limelight gave its customers
instructions on how to modify the page.'" Akamai sued, alleging
both direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and induced
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)."
McKesson owned a patent covering a method of electronic
communication between healthcare providers and their patients.20
McKesson sued Epic, a software company, which licensed
healthcare software to healthcare organizations. 2' Epic's software
system "MyChart" allowed healthcare providers to communicate
with their patients.22 McKesson alleged induced infringement
under U.S.C. § 271(b) claiming Epic caused its customers to
directly infringe McKesson's patent through the use of the
"MyChart" system. 23 McKesson asserted that although Epic did
not perform any of the steps that infringed the patented method
itself, Epic's system provided a method for healthcare providers
and patients to communicate electronically.24 McKesson
contended that the healthcare providers and patients collectively
infringed its patent through the use of Epic's system, and since
Epic provided the system, it should be liable for induced
infringement.2 5
15. Id. at 1306.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1306.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1306.
25. Id.
2013]1 237
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Both of the above controversies resulted in district court
judgments finding neither Limelight nor Epic infringed the
relevant patent.26 Limelight was held not liable for infringement in
a judgment as a matter of law because Limelight's customers
performed some of the steps required to complete Akamai's
patented method.27 Epic was held not liable for infringement in a
summary judgment motion because the patients, not Epic's direct
customers, performed the step of initiating communication. 28
Both cases demonstrated district court reliance on Federal
Circuit cases, including specifically BMC Resources, Inc. v
Paymentech, L.P. and Muniauction Inc. v. Thompson Corp.. 29
BMC, the court held that in order for a party to be liable for
induced infringement, some other single entity must be liable for
direct infringement.30 Similarly, in Muniauction, the court rejected
direct infringement claims of method patents in which several
parties collectively committed the acts that constituted
infringement, with no single party completing all of the elements
on its own."
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. History ofDirect Infringement with Respect to Inducement
The court in Akamai began by discussing the statutes defining
direct infringement and induced infringement.3 2 Direct
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) requires a single actor to
perform all the elements of a claim to be liable.3 3 Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b), induced infringement requires an actor to induce another
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1307.
29. Id. at 1307 (citing BMC Resources, Inc v. Paymentech L.P., 498 F.3d
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled by Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks,
Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Muniauction Inc. v. Thompson Corp., 532
F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
30. See BMCRes., 498 F.3d at 1381-82.
31. Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329.
32. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1305.
33. Id. at 1307.
238
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actor to commit all the elements to satisfy a claim for
infringement .34 Here, the court recognized that a unique problem
presented itself when the acts completing direct infringement were
shared between multiple parties.35 The court then clearly stated the
problems addressed in this case were whether a single defendant
may be held liable for induced infringement where the defendant
performed some of the steps of a claimed method, and induced
other parties to commit the remaining steps, or if the defendant
induced other parties to collectively perform all the steps of the
claimed method but no single party performed every element on its
own. 3 6  This problem of divided infringement in induced
infringement cases usually only occurs when asserting method
claims. In product or apparatus claims, the law is clear that when
an actor installs the final piece to complete the claimed invention,
said actor is then liable for direct infringement.3 8 In method
claims, however, parties may practice the claimed method jointly
and, furthermore, it may even be more natural for parties to work
together to complete the method's elements.39 Precedent stated
that unless a party controlled or induced a party to perform all the
steps of the method, the patent holder was not entitled to a finding
of direct infringement.40 The court believed this reasoning was
flawed and found a need to change precedent to fix this problem.4 1
The Federal Circuit did not, however, address the problem of
divided infringement as it applied to direct infringement, but rather
only focused its analysis on divided infringement's relationship to
induced infringement.42
B. The Court's Analysis ofInducement Claims Precedent
In the past, the Federal Circuit held that for a party to be liable
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1305.
37. Id.
38. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1306.
39. Id. at 1306.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
2013] 239
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for direct infringement, that party must commit all the acts
required to infringe, either directly or vicariously. 43 For method
claims, this would require an actor to complete every step of the
claim, or complete them through an entity directly under the
actor's control." Direct infringement of method claims had not
been extended to multiple parties that collectively complete all of
the steps of a method claim.45 Since direct infringement is a strict
liability tort, there was a fear that some parties may be found guilty
of infringement when they unknowingly completed some of the
infringement elements.46 Direct infringement by multiple parties
would not be found without some kind of agency relationship, and
the court saw no reason to change that view. 47
Induced infringement, on the other hand, extends to any party
who advises, encourages, or otherwise induces others to engage in
infringing conduct. 48 This form of liability fits the Akamai and
McKesson fact patterns well and gave the court the opportunity to
determine if liability should be extended to a party who induced
infringing conduct when a single "induced" entity did not
complete all the required steps for direct infringement. 49 Because
induced infringement is not a strict liability tort, the inducing party
must act with knowledge that the induced acts would constitute
direct infringement." The law was also clear that there could be
no induced infringement without direct infringement, or in other
words, there could be no indirect infringement without direct
infringement." This is based off the principle that there is no such
thing as attempted patent infringement.5 2
The court found its holdings in BMC and Muniauction
troubling." In those cases, the Federal Circuit held that in order to
43. Id. at 1307.
44. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1307.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1307-08.
50. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1308.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
240
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support a finding of induced infringement, there needed to be
direct infringement and that all of the elements of direct
infringement needed to be completed by a single actor.54 The court
noted that there was a distinction between direct infringement
being committed and a single actor being held liable for direct
infringement." By focusing its rationale on the overall impact felt
by the patentee, the court found little reason to insulate an inducer
from liability simply because the induced parties' manifested their
conduct in way that a single party did not complete every step of
the claim.56 A party who induced a single party to complete all the
steps for infringement has an identical effect to a patentee as a
party that induces multiple parties to complete all of the steps."
Additionally, if one party completes some of the steps of a
patented claim and then induces another party to complete the rest,
the patentee feels the same effect as if the first party completed all
of the steps itself." The court said it would be a bizarre result to
allow a party to evade liability simply because it created a scheme
where it completed nearly all the elements of infringement but
directed another party to complete the final step." The court
further reasoned that the text of the inducement statute was
consistent with this line of reasoning.6 0 The court found nothing in
the statute that would limit liability to infringement completed by a
single party and the statute focused more on the steps required for
infringement rather than the number of parties required to
complete it.6'
C. Legislative History of the 1952 Patent Act
The court also pointed to the legislative history of the 1952
Patent Act to support its view that induced infringement does not
require a single induced party complete all the acts necessary to
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1308-09.
56. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1309.
57. Id. at 1309.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id
2013] 241
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constitute direct infringement.6 2 One of the principal drafters of
the statute, Giles Rich, made it clear during hearings about
contributory infringement that the revised provisions on
infringement were intended to reach cases of divided infringement
even if no one party could be held liable for direct infringement. 3
The drafters believed that obvious infringement should be
remediable even if there is an absence of a direct infringer.'
D. Examination of Other Areas ofLaw
The court next examined other areas of law where a principal
can be held liable if the principal induces an agent or an innocent
intermediary to complete an unlawful act." As an example, the
court noted that an individual can be convicted for aiding and
abetting the commission of a crime even when the principal is not
found liable for the unlawful conduct.66 As long as the induced
criminal conduct occurred, the accessory can be held liable
regardless of whether or not the principal is held liable." Even
more persuasively, tort law recognizes liability for inducing
innocent actors to commit tortious acts if the inducer knew or
should have known the acts would be tortious if the inducer
committed the acts himself." This is persuasive reasoning because
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) courts will look to joint tortfeasance
common law when considering induced infringement." The First
and Second Restatement of Torts also support the idea that a party
that induces an act can be held liable even if the person actually
committing the induced act does not know the act is injurious and
escapes liability.70
62. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1309.
63. Id. at 1310.
64. Id. at 1311.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1312.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1312-13.
242
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E. Majority 's Argument Against Dissent
The majority next addressed Judge Linn's dissent." Judge Linn
contended that the majority defined infringement differently under
§§ 271(a) and (b), and instead argued that these two subsections
should be read with a consistent definition of infringement.7 2 The
majority countered this assertion by saying that a reading of both
sections reveals that the acts defining infringement are not
necessarily the same between the two sections, and in reality
describe two different types of conduct.7 ' The majority went into
further examples within section 271 that showed that infringement
is not uniformly defined throughout the section.74 The dissent also
relied on section 281 to show that a civil action for infringement
required a single actor to complete all the steps of infringement.
The majority indicated--however- that section 281 was merely
meant as a preamble to ensure a claim would be triable to a jury.6
Additionally, the legislative history of section 281 does not
indicate that the scope of liability for induced infringement should
be limited to infringement committed by a single actor.
The majority also faulted the dissent for its misplaced reliance
on the holding in the Supreme Court case Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964). While
the majority contended that the dissent misunderstood the holding
in Aro by asserting that infringement must be committed by a
single entity; the majority believed that case stood for the principle
that there cannot be contributory infringement without actual
infringement. This dissent, however, erroneously asserted that Aro
held that infringement must be committed by a single entity."1
Additionally, the majority noted that Aro stood for product claims
71. Id at 1314.
72. Id
73. Id.
74. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1314.
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id. at 1315.
78. Id.
79. Id at 1315-16.
2013] 243
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whereas the present case deals with a method claim."o The
difference is significant because the party that places the final
piece in an infringing product is said to directly infringe a patent,
whereas a method claim requires multiple steps of a method to be
completed for infringement to occur." The majority noted that
most other early cases dealing with the problem of induced
infringement dealt with product claims, so divided infringement
was not an issue.82 Cases that dealt with the divided infringement
problem in method claims looked to contributory infringement
doctrine and held that when a party completes several steps of a
method and knew the next party completed the final step, the first
party would be liable for contributory infringement but not direct
infringement." The majority said that this logic stands for two
major propositions in this case: (1) that a party cannot be held
liable for direct infringement of a method claim unless that party
personally or vicariously completed all the steps of the method and
(2) induced infringement can be found even if there is no single
party who would be liable for direct infringement.84
In total, the majority believed that if one either believed the
majority's opinion or the dissent's, either could be viewed as a
change in the law." The dissent argued that the majority's opinion
constituted a "sweeping change to the nation's patent policy" and
that such a change should be left to Congress, rather than the
courts." But the majority asserted that based on the legislative
history, general tort principles, and prior case law, precedent such
as BMC altered the original view of induced infringement and that
view needed to be corrected."
F. Conclusion
In sum, the court found induced infringement for method claims
80. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1316.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1317.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1317-18.
85. Id. at 1318.
86. Akamai Techs., 692. F.3d at 1318.
87. Id.
244
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did not require a single party to complete all the elements for
direct infringement." The court overruled the holding in BMC that
required a single entity to complete every element of a claim for
direct infringement.89 The court also noted that it did not believe
that Congress intended to create a "single entity rule" that allowed
a party to avoid infringement liability by arranging a system by
which the party would complete only some of the steps of a
method claim and then influence another party to complete the
final steps of the method.90
The court held in the McKesson case that Epic could be held
liable for inducing infringement if it is demonstrated Epic (1)
knew of McKesson's patent, (2) induced the performance of the
steps in the method patent, and (3) all of those steps were
performed.9 ' Similarly, in the Akamai case, Limelight could be
held liable if it could be shown (1) Limelight knew of Akamai's
method patent, (2) Limelight performed all but one of the steps of
the patent, (3) it induced the content providers to complete the
final step of the method patent, and (4) the content providers
actually performed the final step.92 Both cases were therefore
reversed and remanded for further proceedings based upon the
court's new finding regarding the theory of induced infringement. 3
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
There are several implications that may stem from the Federal
Circuit's holding, some having impacts on forthcoming patents
and others suggesting trends in the Court's view of similar cases in
the future. At the outset, it should be noted that the decision
should have no affect on product claims: a single direct infringer
is still required in the context of indirect infringement product
claims as the court does not address that issue in the case. 94
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Akamai Techs., 692 F.3d at 1318.
93. Id. at 1318-19.
94. Id. at 1307.
2013] 245
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Instead, the essential reasoning in the case was twofold. First, the
inducement statute itself does not expressly limit direct
infringement to one single actor." Second, it would be a bizarre
result to allow a bad actor to avoid liability by simply creating a
scheme in which two or more parties collectively practiced the
claimed steps.96
This new standard makes it clear to both patent holders and bad
actors alike that liability for method claim infringement can stem
from knowingly inducing two or more parties to collectively
infringe the claim. This will and should make practitioners more
aware of how they draft their patent claims. There may be a
temptation for drafters to be more lax in crafting patent claims
since liability has been extended to situations where liability may
not have been found in the past. This would be faulty reasoning.
Patent drafters should still draft claims that target a single party's
actions so patentees have a lower burden of proof for proving
infringement.
Finally, the Federal Circuit showed that it could step away from
rigid rules it applied in the past and adopt a new standard in
response to bad actors. This is a positive sign for the Federal
Circuit. Although not exclusively, a large part of the Federal
Circuit's docket is related to new technologies. With that comes
new ways of applying existing technologies that could not be
anticipated at their inception. As the technology and ways to
apply it change, the Court must be able to adjust its views on the
law to compensate for the change. This ruling suggests the
Federal Circuit is willing to do that in some situations.
Patrick McMahon*
95. Id. at 1306.
96. Id. at 1309.
* J.D. Candidate 2015, DePaul University College of Law; B.S. 2006, United
States Air For Academy. I would like to sincerely thank Professor Anthony
Volini his guidance and suggestions, as well as my editors for all of their help
with this project.
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